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A LEGAL SOLUTION TO THE ELECTRIC 
POWER CRISIS: CONTROLLING DEMAND 
THROUGH REGULATION OF ADVER-
TISING, PROMOTION, AND 
RATE STRUCTURE 
By David H. Perma,..:· 
I. THE ELECTRIC POWER CRISIS-CONSERVATION 
VERSUS BURNING KILOWATTS1 
The ever upward growth of the electric power industry has 
been a much discussed topic in recent years. Figures released by 
the Federal Power Commission (FPC) in connection with their 
1970 National Power Survey indicate that peak demand will go 
from 277,921,000 kilowatts in 1970 to 1,056,000,000 kilowatts in 
1990.2 They are predicting an average annual growth in con-
sumption of 7.1 %, a doubling in consumption every ten years. 
In the past, we as a nation have greeted such news with un-
restrained enthusiasm. The growth of the electric power in-
dustry has meant more jobs, a higher gross national product, 
and a higher standard of living. Daily we find new uses for elec-
tric power which enable the consumer to do more work in less 
time. 
Recognizing these blessings of electric power, the nation, 
through government and private industry policies, has encour-
aged more and more consumption of electric power. We have 
priced electricity so cheaply and made it so readily available 
that rarely does the homeowner, industry, or commercial estab-
lishment consider electricity as a major factor of operation. 
Virtually no one other than Lyndon Johnson has ever made a 
serious effort to reduce electrical expenses by reducing usage. 
(President Johnson's effort to turn out unused lights at the White 
House was a notable failure.) 
670 
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The recent national concern with environmental matters has 
revealed that producing electric power is a mixed blessing. The 
fossil-fuel electric-generating plant is second only to the auto-
mobile as an air polluter. Nuclear power plants create difficult-
to-dispose electric wastes and pose the threat of nuclear accidents. 
The power industry and the Federal Government are now taking 
pollution seriously, and it appears that air pollution from fossil-
fuel plants will be significantly reduced and that adequate con-
trols will be placed on nuclear plants. 
There is another aspect of the electric power industry which 
is not so easily handled: sheer size and rapid rate of growth. This 
creates at least four major problem areas. The first is that in some 
areas, particularly the East Coast, the electric utilities have 
become so large that they cannot build fast enough to keep up 
with their present 7-10% rate of growth. Boston, New York, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington have all experienced 
voltage reductions and blackouts during peak demand periods in 
the last two years. Each year the utilities promise that more 
power plants will be available next year, but when next year 
comes they find that increases in demand have matched or 
exceeded increases in capacity. 
The second problem created by growth in the electric power 
industry is a lack of space for power plant siting.3 Virtually 
every electric utility has difficulty locating new sites for power 
plants which bring no reasonable objections from some com-
peting interests for the land.4 But the problem is more serious 
than that. The Committee for Environmental Information, 
using very conservative figures, has calculated that all land in the 
United States will be covered by power plants in less than two 
centuries at the present rate of growth.5 Other calculations 
indicate that the problem is even more serious. Using the FPC 
predictions for peak demand in 1990,6 and assuming 400 acres 
for a 3,000 megawatt installation,1 over six percent of all land and 
water area in the United States (including Alaska, Hawaii, and 
all possessions) will be occupied by power plants in 1990. (This 
does not include transmission lines.) As a comparison, at present 
all cities, towns, highways, railroads, airports and sites for in-
dustry occupy only four percent of the land and water area. 
Assuming a doubling every ten years after 1990, we will run out 
of land and water space by 2040, less than seventy years away. 
A third problem area is that of waste heat disposal. At present, 
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about eighty percent of our electric power capacity is in steam-
electric generators. 8 They are expected to be 93% of capacity 
by 1990. Steam-electric generators, whether nuclear or fossil-
fuel, are extremely inefficient converters to electric power. 
Approximately two-thirds of the energy converted is lost as 
waste heat. 9 According to the Committee for Environmental 
Information, "In the year 2000, if power consumption continues 
to increase at the present rate and there is no great increase in 
overall efficiency (which there is unlikely to be), power plants of 
all kinds will produce roughly enough heat to raise by twenty 
degrees the total volume of the United States in a year."lO 
The fourth problem area is that of waste materials. Although 
we are developing means to control and dispose of the more 
deadly wastes, the rapid growth rate threatens to overwhelm 
these efforts. We may now be building plants which put fewer 
sulfur and nitrogen oxides into the air, but the growth rate in 
the power industry may result in a net increase in these pollu-
tants. Moreover, less dangerous waste materials such as carbon 
dioxide will, through volume, become a difficult problem.l1 
It would be comforting if there were technological solutions 
available for these problems. In fact, there are many imaginative 
ideas (solar energy, tidal energy, and fuel cells) which hold the 
promise of solution, but none may be implemented today. Even 
if we embark on an ambitious development program, it would 
be highly unlikely that we would have an operational solution 
by the turn of the century. Nuclear power provides an example. 
The Atomic Energy Commission has spent billions for nuclear 
development in the last twenty years. Today nuclear power is 
producing less than two percent of our electric power, and it will 
be thirty more years before nuclear power is producing over half 
of our electrical needs. We are building today the plants which 
will serve our needs in the year 2000. 
It is clear that the electric power industry cannot continue to 
grow at its present rate for much longer. Our natural resources 
are finite; we have a limited amount of land, air, and water to 
serve all of the demands that society places on them. Electric 
power cannot claim all of these resources. In fact it must be 
limited to a small percent of them if we are to be able to enjoy 
the many benefits of electric power. 
Unfortunately, many of those who have considered the power 
problem accept the present rate of growth as absolutely necessary 
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to meet our future power needs. The president of American 
Electric Power Company, Inc. recently expressed this opinion: 
It has been suggested that environmental considerations may 
require a reduction or stabilization in the demand for electric power. 
This is sheer nonsense .... Our economic and social system is high 
energy-oriented, and it is not going to change. The public will either 
have an unlimited supply of electric power or there will be a lot of 
new faces in both utility board rooms and government offices, both 
state and federal.12 
Mr. Cook sees no conflict between a pollution-free environ-
ment and an unlimited supply of electricity.13 
There is a direct conflict between clean environment and un-
controlled growth in the electric power industry. The electric 
power industry is rapidly approaching the point where each 
increase in its size takes resources from other activities. The 
value of these activities may be considerably greater than the 
value of increasing generating capacity. Thus, we must set an 
absolute limit on the number of electric-generating plants in 
the United States. 
II. THE PROBLEM-GROWTH IN DEMAND 
A. Factors Beyond the Control of Utilities 
Population would, at first blush, seem to be a primary factor. 
Decisions which influence population growth remain with the 
individual, although governmental policies may have a more 
direct effect in the future. It seems plausible that one could 
control the demand for electricity by controlling population. 
However, population growth has not been responsible for the 
mass of growth in electric power.a In recent years the rate of 
population growth has shown a marked decrease; at the same 
time, the rate of growth in demand for electricity has been in-
creasing. Per capita consumption of electricity has been increasing 
five times as fast as population growthY Unfortunately, much of 
this per capita increase in consumption of electricity does not 
result in an increased standard of living. Instead we substitute 
higher power consumptive products for lower power consumptive 
products.16 This is particularly true of the growth in the use of 
aluminum, cement, and chemical products, which now consume 
18% of all electric power produced in this countryP 
A second factor beyond the control of the utilities is the 
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economy. This factor includes employment, income, gross na-
tional product, industrial production and construction.18 The 
relation between increases in the economy and increases in elec-
trical production is a mutually beneficial one. But as with popu-
lation, advances in the economy are not responsible for most 
electrical power growth. Measured in constant dollar terms, 
GNP has been increasing at one-half the rate of electric power. 
A third factor is the shift from other energy sources to electric 
power. This shift is due in part to the decreasing cost of pro-
ducing electricity. It also reflects the fact that many jobs can 
be done more safely, more cleanly, or more efficiently electrically. 
Recently, some shifts by industry from direct burning of fossil 
fuels to electricity have been motivated by a desire to solve an 
air pollution problem. This, of course, only shifts the air pollution 
from the factory to the electric utility since utilities primarily 
use fossil fuels to generate electricity. 
A fourth factor is the influence of governmental policies de-
signed to increase electrical energy use,19 The Rural Electrifica-
tion Program is the outstanding example. The efforts of the 
Atomic Energy Commission with respect to the promotion of 
nuclear power are also well-known.2o In addition, there are 
numerous tax incentives, depreciation allowances, and loan 
policies which have the effect of stimulating the use of electricity. 
It should be noted further that many of the programs necessary 
to clean up the environment will also increase the use of electric-
ity In particular, if electric vehicles were ever to come into com-
mon use, the demand for electricity would receive another large 
boost. 
B. Factors Controlled by Utilities 
In addition to the factors discussed above, there are three 
other factors which influence demand: promotion, advertising, 
and pricing. Unlike the previously mentioned factors, however, 
these are exclusively under the control of the utilities. 
The electric utilities are most reticent to discuss the influence 
of marketing activities on growth in demand. They would prefer 
the public to consider the demand for electric power as a neces-
sary result of our rising affluence and expanding economy. Yet 
these factors have a decisive effect on demand growth, and, as the 
utilities discovered long ago, they are easily manipulated. 
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In explaining why its 1980 electrical demand forecast made in 
1969 was 60 million kilowatts higher than the 1980 forecast made 
in 1964, the Federal Power Commission stated: 
The updated figures make greater allowances for growth in electric 
air condi tioning and space hea ting, reflecting widespread promotional 
efforts of electrical utilities across the Nation.21 
Similarly, the Load Forecasting Methodology Committee,22 
in discussing marketing policy effects on load forecasting, had 
this to say: 
So far load characteristics have been dealt with as if the utility 
had no control over emerging patterns. There are, however, many 
ways in which the utility can help shape the changes taking place in 
its service territory. 
a. Promotion 
Promotional effects on load can be divided into two types: short-
term and long-term. Most systems use some sort of annual sales 
quota which may take a variety of forms such as appliance units, 
annual energy requirements, connected load or estimated annual 
revenue. For the most part, these will not have a significant effect 
on the total load character of the system except in the case of major 
residential appliances and certain industrial devices. 
In the longer term, promotional policies are aimed at changing 
people's buying and living habits. In such cases, even smaller elee-
trical usage devices could have a significant impact on load patterns. 
Such promotional policies could be aimed at either of two objectives: 
gaining acceptance for an entirely new application or expanding the 
electric share of the market for existing applications. 
b. Pricing 
Pricing can be part of a promotional program but is also a separa-
ble variable affecting long-term load growth characteristics. Declin-
ing electric energy costs vis-a-vis competitive energy forms offer 
opportunities for increasing penetration of all markets. 
This may take two different forms: (a) an increase in existing 
applications in residential, commercial and industrial markets and 
(b) increased acceptance of new electric energy-consuming devices 
which compete with other energy forms, such as the use of electric 
space heating in residences and commercial structures.23 
The Committee apparently includes advertising under its discus-
sion of promotion. It distinguished between long-term and short-
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term effects of marketing policies by pointing to the obvious fact 
that pricing and promotion will have a greater influence on load 
characteristics (demand) over the long-term. 
It should be noted that the Committee has included a discus-
sion of declining energy costs under pricing. The Committee has 
apparently confused electric energy costs with pricing; while 
electric energy costs reflect primarily technological factors, pric-
ing reflects revenue-producing factors, i.e., how charges are al-
located to various consumers. Although the mistake may not 
have been inadvertent, it is understandable since both factors 
make electricity more competitive with other energy forms, and 
since the utilities often use declining costs to justify a promo-
tional pricing policy. 
III. WHY UTILITIES STRIVE FOR MAXIMUM 
GROWTH IN PEAK DEMAND 
It is a peculiar phenomenon of the electric utility industry that 
at a time when there is an inadequate electric power supply, the 
industry as a whole, as well as the individual companies, con-
tinue to advertise, promote, and price their product in a manner 
designed to increase peak demand. This should be contrasted 
with non-regulated industries which, when confronted with the 
same situation (demand in excess of supply), normally close ad-
vertising and promotional activities and raise prices. Despite the 
wasted resources and lost revenues sustained through such 
policies, the electric utilities have several cogent reasons for 
making every effort to maximize demand whether or not they 
can supply the power. 
An electric utility's profits (return on investment) is de-
termined by multiplying the rate base (capital investment) 
times the rate of return (determined through a regulatory process, 
normally 6-7%).24 Thus, a utility increases its profits by increas-
ing its rate base or its rate of return. The value of the rate base 
falls between two extremes: original cost and cost of production. 
In other words, when placing a value on an electric generating 
plant for purposes of determining the rate base, the regulatory 
commission will consider the original cost of building that plant 
and the cost of reproducing it today. Under inflationary condi-
tions (what has been and is expected to be the normal condition 
for the future) the commission will favor the lower original cost, 
while the utilities will favor the hi~her cost of reproduction. Since 
the Hope Natural Gas case,25 a majority of the state commissions 
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use original cost, one uses reproduction cost, and the rest use some 
value in between.26 
Thus, for an electric utility to make profits and prevent its 
rate base from stagnating, it must build more new power plants. 
Or, as one economist put it, "To the extent that a utility's per-
mitted rate of return exceeds the cost of capital to it, the utility 
will wish to acquire additional capital, as long as it goes into the 
rate base."27 If a utility does not build any new plants for a con-
siderable period of time and its rate base is valued at something 
less than reproduction cost, then the utility's rate of return 
today is determined by yesterday's cost of building a plant. This 
can mean a substantial reduction in profits to the extent that 
inflation has occurred between the time the plant was built and 
the present. 
In order to build the greatest number of power plants possible, 
the electric utilities maximize demand for their product and 
prevent the generation of electricity by anyone else within their 
service area. We have already discussed how utilities maximize 
demand through advertising, promotion and pricing. The 
utilities control electricity generation in their service area with 
the same basic tools of marketing. For example, in New York, 
Consolidated Edison Company refuses to sell natural gas to 
office buildings, shopping centers, and apartment houses if they 
are going to use the natural gas to generate electricity. Across 
the river in Brooklyn, where gas and electricity are not controlled 
by the same company, the Brooklyn Union Gas Company does 
sell gas to large developments which use their own turbines to 
generate electricity and heat or air-condition the buildings.28 
The electric utilities that do not control gas distribution can 
often achieve the same effect by offering "special" prices to 
developments which might consider generating their own power. 
Often this special price is disguised in the form of promotional 
allowances. 
An additional problem created by the use of the rate base is 
that utilities will resist any technological advance, such as 
regional interconnecting power grids or fuel cells, which does not 
include a need for large capital investments by the local utility.29 
This suggests that it may be necessary to find an alternative to 
the rate base. (Such an investigation, however, is not within the 
scope of this article.) 
All utilities must, from time to time, seek an increase in their 
rate of return from a regulatory commission. In addition, there 
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is a growing trend to have utilities seek permits before con-
structing a new power plant.30 In proceedings on such matters, it 
is extremely helpful to the utilities if they can justify the rate 
increase or the expanded facilities in terms of the needs of the 
service areas and the demands of their consumers. For these 
purposes, the higher the demand growth rate, the better. 
Over a set period of time, the demand for a utility's electricity 
varies considerably, while the utility's ability to supply elec-
tricity is constant. This is referred to as the load factor. Normally, 
an electric utility will have peak demand periods in the summer 
and win ter and low poin ts in the spring and fall. I t is very 
desirable in terms of efficiency and profits to even out these 
peaks and valleys so that demand will, at all times, roughly 
correspond with supply. In practice, the utilities attempt to 
raise both the peaks and the valleys. To the extent that the 
valleys approach the level of supply, the utilities will profit from 
a more efficient operation. If the peaks reach or exceed the ca-
pacity of the utilities this becomes justification for the new 
plant building necessary to augment the rate base. If peak 
demand actually exceeds capacity, a utility has nothing to lose 
economically. In fact, it enhances the utility's position vis-a-vis 
the regulatory commission. The utility's public relations will 
suffer, but, unlike non-regulated industries, bad public relations 
will not translate into economic loss. A utility's customers cannot 
go to another supplier. 
A utility's total revenue is determined by adding costs and the 
return on investment. Thus, increasing or unnecessary expenses 
have no effect on a utility's profits. Economists refer to this as a 
disincentive.3! This disincentive goes a long way in explaining 
why an electric utility continues to advertise and promote its 
product when it no longer has any power to sell. This, of course, 
is a complete waste of resources. Due to the nature of the rate-
determining process, the cost of this waste is paid, not by the 
utility, but by the utility's rate-payers. 
A final reason why an electric utility will push for maximum 
expansion was expressed by Galbraith in reference to public 
corporations in general: 
This goal [expansion] also commends itself strongly to the self-
interest of the technostructure. Expansion of output means expansion 
of the technostructure itself. Such expansion, in turn, means more 
jobs with more responsibility and hence more promotion and more 
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compensation. When a man makes decisions leading to successful 
expansion, he not only creates new openings but also recommends 
himself and his colleagues as particularly suitable candidates to fill 
them! The paradox of modern economic motivation is that profit 
maximization as a goal requires that the individual member of the 
technostructure subordinate his personal pecuniary interest to that 
of the remote and unknown stockholder. By contrast, growth, as a 
goal, is wholly consistent with the personal and pecuniary interest 
of those who participate in decisions and direct the enterprise.32 
Galbraith's comments are even more applicable to the typical 
utility where profits are regulated and risk practically non-
existen t. 33 
IV. FAILURE OF REGULATORY CONTROLS 
No regulatory commission in the United States has ever at-
tempted to regulate utility advertising, promotion, or rate 
structure for the purpose of con trolling demand for electric power 
or con trolling the commensurate utili ty growth. Recen tl y, a few 
commissions have attempted to regulate promotional activities, 
but this was for the purpose of protecting the consumer and 
competing energy forms from unfair trade practices and unfair 
competition. These actions have left the utilities relatively un-
encumbered in their advertising and promotional efforts to in-
crease demand. 
With respect to rates, a study by George J. Stigler and Claire 
Friedland reveals that regulatory activity has no influence on 
rate discrimination which acts to increase electrical consump-
tion.34 In comparing regulated and unregulated states, they 
found no differences in discriminations made between large and 
small quantity consumers or between residential and industrial 
consumers. Apparently, regulatory commissions allow the utilities 
to make any rate discrimination they desire if it is for the purpose 
of increasing sales. 
This failure of the commissions is not surprising. It has only 
been in the last four years that we have been experiencing elec-
trical power shortages. Moreover, it has only been in the last two 
years that the factors expressed in Part I of this paper have 
become a matter of general knowledge and concern. Throughout 
its history, the electric power industry has decreased cost while 
increasing production. Thus, maximum expansion has always 
been in the consumers' interests. Unfortunately, times have 
680 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
changed. For the larger utilities, increasing capacity now means 
increasing costs, and maximum expansion is no longer in the 
public interest. 
"Regulation is a substitute for competition and should at-
tempt to put the regulated industries under the same restraints 
competition places on nonregulated industries."35 We are dealing 
here with two situations where the commissions have not so re-
strained the utilities. The first is where demand within a utility's 
service area exceeds the utility's ability to supply electric power 
(a situation which exists for several utilities today). In a non-
regulated competitive situation the utility would normally stop 
advertising and promotion, since such activities would no longer 
be needed and would, therefore, be a wasteful expense. The 
utility would also be expected to raise prices to achieve maximum 
revenue and to absorb up the excess demand. As explained in 
Part III above the utilities in fact continue to advertise, pro- . 
mote, and price their product as if they had an infinite supply. 
The second situation is one where costs increase with increased 
production. In a non-regulated competitive industry a firm 
would again cease advertising and promotion and raise prices so 
that it could limit production. A regulated electric utility would 
take the opposite approach, however, since increased costs which 
would go into the rate base would result in increased profits and 
since increased costs which would not go into the rate base 
would be operating expenses paid by the rate-payers. 
Finally, the commissions have failed to regulate properly the 
allocation of true cost. The commissions have cooperated fully 
with the utilities in their efforts to provide electricity at lower 
prices. If this effort were limited to helping the utilities achieve 
lower costs through technological gains, it would be in rate-
payers' interests. In most instances, however, lower prices are 
achieved by changes in accounting procedures, government sub-
sidies, loans or tax policies, or by leaving costs to be absorbed by 
the general public. Such costs include treating air and water 
pollution, funding research and development, and installing un-
derground lines. 
V. ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITY 
In recen t years, there has been a significant upsurge in the 
advertising and promotional practices of the electric utilities. 
For the most part this has been an effort to capture the space-
heating market, an area dominated by the gas utilities, fuel oil 
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and bottled gas dealers. With lesser success, the gas utilities have 
attempted to retaliate by capturing some of the air-conditioning 
market. The result has been increased interfuel competition 
using not only pricing, but installation and appliance allowances, 
advertising allowances, financial assistance and cash payments. 
Most of these payments or discounts are given by electric utilities 
to developers for the building of all-electric homes. 
This promotional activity has been the subject of recent Con-
gressional hearings,36 and a report by the Federal Power Com-
missionY The FPC report concludes that, " ... this review of 
recent state commission actions indicates a trend toward more 
restrictive policies with respect to acceptable practices."38 How-
ever, none of these state commission actions were taken for the 
purpose of controlling demand for electricity. "The primary 
regulatory consideration at present seems to be the effect on the 
utilities and their customers, while the fallout effects on other 
private sectors mayor may not be considered."39 The actions of 
the commissions, while providing some minor impediments to 
utility activity, have had little if any effect on the utility's 
efforts to stimulate demand. As the FPC report states, "Related 
questions such as the advisability of utilities engaging in certain 
promotional practices in a period of strain on the available supply 
of electricity, are outside the scope of the report."40 As was dis-
cussed in the previous section, such questions in practice are 
outside the scope of the regulatory commissions also. 
The electric utilities usually justify their advertising and 
promotion by saying that they are not increasing peak demand 
for electricity, but only attempting to improve the load factor 
(the use of electricity during off-peak periods). This is at best 
only a half-truth. The utilities are most interested in increasing 
peak demand because that is the primary means of increasing 
the rate base, which in turn is the primary means of increasing 
their profits. Improving the load factor only gives increased prof-
its on a short-term basis; such profits will be eliminated in the 
next rate adjustment by the regulatory commission. 
The primary goal of utility promotion and advertising then is 
increase in peak demand. In fairness to the utilities, there is no 
reason to believe that they spurn a balanced load factor in favor 
of peak demand. An improved load factor does mean decreased 
costs and a reduction or holding down of rates. This, of course, 
is beneficial to both the utility and the rate-payer. 
The problem with using advertising and most promotional ac-
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tivity to balance a utility's load is that neither of these activities 
is sufficiently selective. The advertising or promotion will ad-
vocate the use of a certain appliance, but the utility cannot 
control when the consumer will use it. The appliance sold by 
the advertising may become a part of the peak or off-peak loads. 
It is possible that some appliances are primarily used at only a 
certain time and never contribute to peak loads. To the extent 
that this is true, utilities should be permitted to advertise and 
promote this type of use. No utility, however, has ever clearly 
demonstrated through empirical evidence that its advertising a 
certain appliance will only improve the load factor and not in-
crease peak demand. 
There is another way in which advertising and promotion is not 
so discriminating as to improve load balance without increasing 
peaks: when only one electric appliance is promoted, other ap-
pliances will likely be used more frequently. For example, if a 
utility advertises space-heating, there will probably be an increase 
in air-conditioning use as well. This development was shown in 
Joseph Fry's findings that customers prefer not just one product, 
but all similar products in a brand line.41 Brand name (elec-
tricity), in other words, acts as a medium through which con-
sumers generalize loyalties from one category of products to 
another. This was also recognized by Potomac Electric Power 
Company in its answer to a recent complaint: "Pepco admits 
that its advertising and promotional activities designed to in-
crease sales of electric space-heating may also incidentally in-
crease sales of electric air-conditioning."42 
Finally, the load factor argument was described in the follow-
ing manner in a recent California Superior Court Decision: 
The Department sought to justify this advertising approach on 
the ground that it would lead to closing the gap between the peaks 
and valleys of electricity use or load during the year; that it was 
designed to produce a more even load on the system throughout the 
year. But the fallacy of this approach is that as the valleys are raised, 
so are the peaks. If more electricity is used during slack or off-peak 
periods then that much more is used during the expected summer 
and winter periods.43 
Recently two legal actions have explicitly recognized the 
effect that advertising and promotion has on peak demand. On 
October 8, 1970, the Vermont Public Service Board issued a 
Notice of Proposed Rule-Making which would prohibit gas and 
electric utilities from employing any promotional activities in-
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eluding advertising.44 The Board's reasons for the proposed rule 
were simple and persuasive: 
The Board believes it unwise for utilities to incur costs for adver-
tising or in actively promoting the use of a service which is in short 
supply, when costs are rising, when production of the service ad-
versely affects the natural environment, and when such promotional 
practices may be violative of the antitrust laws.45 
The Board's proposed rule met with heavy opposition by the 
gas and electric utilities. As a result, the Board modified the rule 
"along the lines of the National Association of Regula tory Utili ty 
Commissioner's (NARUC) model rule46 and will be issuing it 
shortly."47 There is serious question whether the NARUC model 
rule will adequately protect consumers and utilities from unfair 
trade practices. It will have no effect on advertising and in pro-
motional activities designed to increase demand,48 and in that 
respect it differs sharply from the Board's original stated inten-
tion in issuing the proposed rule.49 
The other action is the decision of the California Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County quoted previously. The case in-
volved the efforts of the Los Angeles Water and Power Depart-
ment to obtain a variance from a rule of the Los Angeles Air 
Pollution Control District so that it could build a large fossil-
fueled steam-electric generating plant which the Department 
maintained was necessary to meet electricity demand between 
1972 and 1976. "The crucial point which this Court must de-
termine ... is whether there is a danger of a shortage of elec-
tricity ... which will outweigh any benefits to the residents of 
the Los Angeles Basin from holding the line on additional sta-
tionary sources of air pollution."50 The Court determined that the 
difference between the population growth (1.75%) and the elec-
tric demand growth (7.6%) was "due primarily to the aggressive 
advertising of the Department, urging a greater use of electricity 
by every resident."51 The court further determined that, "There 
will be no danger of blackouts, total or partial, for the City of 
Los Angeles if the Department of Water and Power will stop its 
advertising programs and cease urging customers and potential 
customers to use more electricity. The money spent for advertis-
ing an increase in the use of electricity could well be spent in 
urging Los Angeles residents to use less electrici ty. If this were 
done the peak demands projected for 1972 to 1976 could be 
revised downward substantially and the need for additional 
generating resources would be proportionately less."52 Accord-
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ingly, the Court denied the Department's request for a variance 
that would enable it to build a new power plant. 
It should be noted that the Los Angeles Department of Water 
and Power finally succeeded in gaining a permit to construct 
additional power generating facilities by making alterations 
which the Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District considered 
acceptable. As a result, further judicial proceedings were aban-
doned. A deputy attorney general for the State of California 
notes that "a few people have grumbled about LAAPCD's deci-
sion, but nobody has publicly taken issue with them."53 
VI. RATE STRUCTURE 
Any discussion of efforts to reduce the growth rate of demand 
for electricity must ultimately examine the rate structure of the 
utilities. A few salient characteristics of the rate structure should 
be recognized at this point. Utilities usually divide their cus-
tomers into three main categories-residential, commercial, and 
industrial. The residential customers are charged on the basis of 
kilowatt hours (kwh) used. The price per kwh is determined by 
the number of kwh used. Thus, for 0-200 kwh the charge may be 
5¢ a kwh; 200-400 kwh-4¢ a kwh; 400-600 kwh-3¢ a kwh; 
and so on. This is referred to as a decreasing block rate. The 
industrial and commercial customers are charged in a similar 
manner except that the number of kwh consumed by each cus-
tomer is considerably larger and the rates are significantly less. 
In addition, industrial and commercial customers often pay a 
demand or load charge-a charge on the number of kilowatts 
they consume at one point in time. 
The utilities justify the use of the decreasing block rate system 
by saying that theirs is a decreasing cost industry and that such 
rates will encourage more consumption which will lead to even 
lower costs and, therefore, even lower prices to consumers. This is 
the practical application of the economists' marginal pricing 
theory. Historically it has worked very well for the utilities and 
their consumers; that is, it has allowed the electric utilities to 
become the largest industry in the United States and to achieve 
large economies of scale while, at the same time, rewarding the 
consumer with lower real prices for electricity. 
There are several cogent reasons for questioning whether the 
electric power industry, particularly the large electric utilities 
with rapid growth rates, is still a decreasing cost industry. 
Generators have gotten so large they offer little if any economies 
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of scale. Costs of labor, materials, and money for financing have 
increased significantly. Accordingly, more and more utilities are 
asking for substantial rate increases.54 For these reasons, both 
the Vermont Public Service Board55 and the Director of the 
Energy Policy Staff of the Office of Science and Technologt6 
have questioned whether the industry is still one of decreasing 
costs. 
Determination of the cost of service to a specific class of cus-
tomers (e.g. residential consumers using 800-1,000 kwh a month) 
depends largely upon the accounting system used. Naturally, the 
industry uses the system which allocates the least cost per kwh 
to the largest customer. There is, then, no demand charge for 
residential users. Factors such as the greater percentage of plant 
capacity necessary to serve high demand users, and other com-
mensurate costs are not considered. Moreover, the utilities use a 
rolled-in average figure in allocating plant costs to each con-
sumer. This does not take into account the fact that the newer 
plants cost many times more than the older plants; these higher 
costs should be allocated to those who make the new demands 
which cause the plants to be built. 
Nor do the electric utilities adequately assess environmental 
costs. In addition to allocating environmental costs dispropor-
tionately with respect to new and old customers and to high and 
low demand customers, the utilities simply do not assess for 
environmental damages which they can avoid paying (e.g. sulfur 
dioxide which escapes pollution control equipment and ultimately 
damages the public). Barry Commoner refers to these as social 
costS.57 Although it is understandable that the utilities would 
ignore these costs, the regulatory commissions should in the 
public interest see that these costs are included in rates, and if 
excess revenues result, the commissions should see that these 
funds are used to mitigate the public damage. To do otherwise 
results in the misallocation of resources referred to previously, 
and allows public injury to go uncompensated-a double loss. 
Finally, the cost argument is often no more than a rationaliza-
tion for self-serving policy. The utilities use marginal costing only 
when it suits them. According to William J. Jefferson, Director 
of Rates and Data Control for the Consumer Power Company, 
"In designing a rate schedule, we price those services closer to 
marginal costs that have a low value of service [low demand 
elasticity], and we price those services further away from margi-
nal costs that have a high value of service."58 While this makes 
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good sense economically (if costs are decreasing), it is in viola-
tion of the regulatory requirement of reasonableness and fairness 
in rate structure. 
The only real requirement on a rate structure is that total 
revenue be equal to all costs and a reasonable return on invest-
ment. Beyond that, the nature of the rate structure depends 
upon the goals to be achieved. If maximum expansion is to be 
achieved, then marginal pricing is the best guide for the rate 
structure. But to the extent that control on growth is desired, 
marginal pricing must be abandoned. 
At the suggestion that the rate structure be used to control 
demand, the electric utilities normally argue that demand for 
electricity is inelastic, i.e., that a change in price will have little 
or no effect on demand. This argument has been supported by an 
econometric study which concluded that residential and com-
mercial demand for electricity in both the short- and long-run was 
inelastic.59 The same study, however, concluded that short-run 
industrial demand for electricity was significantly elastic. 
Additionally, there are two possible weaknesses in this study. 
In the first place, it covered the period 1946-57. Per capita 
consumption has increased significantly since then, and con-
sumers now must be receiving electricity for lower value uses. 
Secondly, the study did not consider space-heating, the largest 
appliance user of electricity, and the reason for expected con-
tinued high rates of expansion by the electric power industry. 
In fact, another, more recent study determined that the demand 
for electric space-heating was highly price-elastic.60 The older 
study is also refuted by an econometric study prepared by Phyllis 
Kline of the FPC's Office of Economics, which determined that 
the relation of electric to gas prices has a significant effect on 
long-run residential demand.61 
William J. Jefferson had this to say about the Fisher/Kaysen 
study, "I find the results of this study very hard to believe. Two 
of the largest energy consumers in the home-the electric hot 
water heater and electric space heating-have such an elastic 
demand that many electric utilities have had to set rates for 
these appliances at or near marginal costs to stimulate their 
use."62 Finally, it should be noted that utilities' spokesmen are 
usually willing to argue that lower prices will increase demand 
while, at the same time, maintaining that higher prices will not 
decrease demand. Such reasoning is illogical. 
The recent increased pressure from public interest groups has 
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caused at least one electric utility holding company to commis-
sion a study of the feasibility of using increasing block residential 
rates to limit demand.63 The study concludes that using price to 
control demand growth rate would be impractical and ineffec-
tive. However, after a discussion of marginal costing and the 
load factor, the arguments in the study become specious. For 
example, they argue that increasing block rates would penalize 
low and moderate income families;64 that utilities would not be 
able to determine how many new power plants to build if in-
creasing block rates were used;65 that increasing block rates would 
be unjustly discriminatory;66 that increasing block rates might 
stimulate consumption by low volume users and create excess 
revenue.67 The study is devoid of any statistical or empirical 
data that would support any of these arguments. 
The most conclusive proof that electricity consumption rates 
are influenced by prices comes from an examination of varying 
characteristics of electrical consumption in different geographic 
areas of the United States. A Business Week report in 1969 con-
tained a chart showing average cost for 250 kwh and average 
annual use in kwh for sixteen utilities around the country.68 
With few exceptions, all of which can be explained by varying 
meteorological conditions and marketing practices, an increase 
in price resulted in a decrease in consumption. There was re-
markable elasticity. 
VII. A SOLUTION 
It would seem that sometime in the next ten years we will have 
to take some steps to limit the growth of electrical power genera-
tion. Such controls will have to remain in effect until we develop 
a means of producing electrical power which does not create the 
problems described in Part I. Unfortunately, the period during 
which such controls will be necessary is likely to stretch in-
definitely. The following program is suggested to limit the growth 
rate; it has the advantage of combining the present regulatory 
system and the market place in order to determine electric 
energy allocation. 
The regulatory commissions should examine factors which 
influence growth in demand and which are beyond the utilities' 
control,69 and they should set a maximum growth rate for each 
utility in their jurisdictions. Then the commissions should re-
quire each utility to adjust those factors which influence demand 
and which are controlled by utilities70 so that the actual growth 
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rate would fall below the regulatory-determined, maximum 
growth rates. A system of substantial pecuniary penalties and 
rewards should be established in order to insure that each utility 
makes a conscientious effort to conform to the maximum growth 
rate and in order to counter the utilities' complaint that growth 
limitations will frustrate management. 71 Assume, for example, 
that the commission sets a maximum growth rate of 5% for a 
utility. If the utility's growth rate for that year is actually 6%, 
the utility will be penalized the value of the increase in the rate 
base necessary to accomodate that 1 % difference in the growth 
rate multiplied by the rate of return. In other words, the utility 
will end up with the same return on investment as if it had only 
grown the required 5%. Similarly, if a utility's actual demand 
growth rate is only 4% for that year, it will be rewarded as if its 
rate base increased enough to accommodate a 5% demand 
growth rate. With such a system, the utilities will likely make 
more than a good faith effort to control demand. 
The utilities would control demand with those marketing tools 
referred to throughout this paper: advertising, promotion and 
rate structure. For those large metropolitan utilities which are 
now growing at a rate of 7-10% a year, the maximum growth 
rate would probably be set somewhere in the range of 3-5% a 
year. For these utilities, the regulatory commissions should 
initially ban all advertising and promotion and institute a rate 
structure which is neutral with respect to increases in consump-
tion. Since, even with these changes, the actual growth rate 
would probably exceed the regulatorily-determined one for 
several years, an escrow fund should be established to deposit the 
excess revenue attributed to the excessive growth. This escrow 
account would then be available to provide funds for the utilities 
to supplement their revenues when the actual growth rate would 
fall below the maximum growth rate. The utilities would still be 
allowed to make rate discriminations between the various classes 
of users (residential, commercial, industrial and several special 
classes such as municipal lighting, and transit companies). These 
discriminations would have to be watched closely, however, in 
order to insure that all large consumers pay well above marginal 
cost and that they work actively to conserve electricity and 
produce their own power (or switch to another source if more 
economical) . 
One of the problems with manipulating demand in this manner 
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is that surprisingly little empirical information is available as to 
the precise effects on demand of advertising, promotion and rate 
structure. An initial period with a neutral rate structure and with 
no advertising and promotion would serve two purposes: (1) it 
would curtail the present growth rate to some degree, and (2) 
it would allow the gathering of data on a base period in which 
demand was not being stimulated. After a three-to-five year 
period with an advertising and promotion ban and a neutral 
rate structure, the commissions and utilities would be in a better 
position to determine what further steps, if any, would be neces-
sary to bring actual demand growth in line with that set by the 
commissions. In time, the utilities could be expected to become 
expert in adjusting their growth rate through minute changes in 
rate structure, promotion or advertising. 
In the past year, several public and private groups have 
urged the development of a national energy policy. The Energy 
Policy Staff of the Office of Science and Technology in the Execu-
tive Office of the President is charged specifically with developing 
such a policy. It seems clear that controlling the growth rate of 
the electric power demand will be a primary goal of such a policy. 
Mr. S. David Freeman, Director of the Energy Policy Staff, has 
advocated controlling demand growth rate through rate struc-
ture in a recent speech.72 The New York Environmental Protec-
tion Administration has also called for a "rational energy policy 
and environmental action plan" for New York State which has 
proposals very similar to those made in this paper;73 such 
proposals should fit very neatly into any future energy policy. 
It is worth considering for a moment what must be the weak 
link in this proposal, namely the regulatory commissions. The 
commissions are the only organizations that now have the neces-
sary expertise and experience in this field. Most of them already 
assume some control over rate structure and promotional ac-
tivities, although not for the purposes of controlling demand. It 
should not be too difficult for each commission to develop a 
regulatory procedure for determining what the maximum demand 
growth rate should be and then oversee the utilities' efforts to 
comply. This process would be similar to their present functions. 
It is not the purpose of this article to consider whether or not the 
commissions now have the necessary authority to control the 
demand growth rate. It should be pointed out, however, that all 
. commissions do have a mandate to require the utilities to provide 
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safe and reliable service. If this mandate is inadequate to require 
each utility to limit its demand growth rate, then the commis-
sions should seek the requisite legislative authority. 
It might be argued that controlling electric power growth 
should be done on the national level. It is unrealistic though to 
expect that Congress will give this type of authority to any na-
tional agency when the state commissions have always acted in 
this field. Moreover, the state commissions are in the best posi-
tions to determine the power needs of their areas, since each area 
requires a different demand growth rate and different policies to 
reach that rate. The national role should be one of coordination, 
only entering the local arena when the state regulatory agencies 
have failed to act. This procedure would be similar to that used 
in the air and water pollution control fields and would make even 
more sense here, where the state commissions are more active. 
In light of the factors presented in Part I, it is apparent that 
most of the major metropolitan utilities will have to take steps 
to control their growth sometime during the next twenty years. 
Whether the utilities will act of their own initiative or on the 
instigation of governmental agencies, and whether they will 
control growth on an ad hoc basis or through a comprehensive 
plan such as is suggested here remains unclear. It is clear, how-
ever, that the sooner the utilities act, the better it will be for all 
concerned, since early action will provide more lead time for 
finding solutions to the problems and will permit a less drastic 
curtailment of the growth rate. The question that remains is 
when will such action be taken. 
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